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The QALY model and individual preferences for health states and health 
profiles over time: A systematic review of the literature 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
The numbers of quality-adjusted life years (QALYs) gained are increasingly being used to 
represent the gains in individual utility from treatment.  This requires that the value of a 
health improvement to an individual is a simple product of gains in quality of life and length 
of life.  The paper reports on a systematic review of the literature on two issues: whether the 
value of a state is affected by how long the state lasts; and by states that come before or after 
it.  It was found that individual preferences over health are influenced by the duration of 
health states and their sequence.  However, whilst there is much variation across individual 
respondents, the assumptions tend to hold much better when valuations are aggregated across 
respondents, which is encouraging for economic evaluations that rely on using average (mean 
or median) values. 
(139 words) 
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The QALY model and individual preferences for health states and health 1 
profiles over time: A systematic review of the literature 2 
 3 
 4 
 5 
1. INTRODUCTION 6 
 7 
Since people experience health benefits as improvements in their quality of life and/or as 8 
increases in their length of life, the quality-adjusted life-year (QALY) attempts to combine 9 
the value of these attributes into a single index number.  At a broad conceptual level, the 10 
value of a QALY is the value of one year spent in full health.  This is then taken as a 11 
benchmark value against which all other health profiles (of whatever duration, in whatever 12 
combination through time) are valued.  However, since there are an infinite number of such 13 
combinations of health states, establishing the benchmark value of each in QALY terms 14 
would be quite impractical, and some simplifying assumptions are introduced.   15 
 16 
In this paper, we present the results from a systematic review of the literature that was 17 
designed to examine the extent to which people’s preferences satisfy some of the key 18 
assumptions of the QALY model explained below.  Our aim has not been to be prescriptive 19 
about which elements of the QALY approach should be adhered to, and we leave it for others 20 
to make their judgements about the normative significance of some of our findings.  We also 21 
consider this to be a review of empirical tests of QALY assumptions and, while we present a 22 
summary of study design (such as the sample size and composition, and the country of 23 
origin), we have made no attempt to assess the quality of empirical studies.  Because people's 24 
preferences are so heavily influenced by the ways in which questions are put to them, it has 25 
not really been possible to systematically assess the quality of the empirical evidence.  For 26 
instance, there are no obvious criteria that allow us to rank between a marginally poorly 27 
designed postal survey with a large and representative sample and a marginally better 28 
designed interview with a small and non-representative sample.  This is in contrast to trial 29 
evidence, for example, where the criteria for assessing the quality of studies are well 30 
established.   31 
 32 
In what follows, section two sets out the QALY model and the assumptions that are tested 33 
here.  Section three describes how the systematic review was undertaken and presents some 34 
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summary data about the studies included in the review.  Section four discusses the empirical 35 
evidence and section five provides a summary of the findings and some conclusions. 36 
 37 
2. THE QALY MODEL AND ITS ASSUMPTIONS 38 
 39 
In the simplest case, with no uncertainty, no temporal discounting, and no changes in health 40 
over time, the value of a health gain from treatment for an individual, QALYG, can be 41 
represented as:   42 
 43 
QALYG = T1Q1 – T0Q0,       [1a] 44 
 45 
where T is the number of years of survival, Q represents health state values, and the 46 
subscripts 1 and 0 represent health with and without treatment, respectively (1). 47 
 48 
Alternatively, introducing uncertainty and temporal discounting, and assuming discrete time 49 
so that changes in health occur only when moving from one period to the next, the expected 50 
net gain of a treatment to any one individual can be expressed as: 51 
 52 
QALYG = ∑h ∑ t p1htQht - ∑h ∑ t p0htQht,      [1b] 53 
 54 
where p1ht and p0ht represent the probabilities of an individual finding himself in health state h 55 
in time period t with and without treatment, respectively.  Qht is the value of health state h at 56 
time t (the subscript t here allows for constant rate temporal discounting so that t
h
ht r
QQ
)1( +
= , 57 
where r is the discount rate). 58 
 59 
This algorithm – the QALY model – is an expression of the value to an individual associated 60 
with a given intervention.  If the quality of life associated with ‘full health’ were to be 61 
assigned a value of 1, then the algorithm could be considered to express health gains 62 
measured in ‘objective physical units’ i.e. life years.  Any state of health less than this is 63 
adjusted for its quality and hence assigned a lower value.  Against a background based on 64 
expected utility theory, Pliskin and colleagues first set out a set of sufficient assumptions for 65 
this simple model to represent individual utility over health states and duration (2).  For 66 
health profiles of constant quality (i.e. “chronic” states), these are mutual utility 67 
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independence between quality of life and duration, constant proportional trade-off, and risk 68 
neutrality over life years.  Bleichrodt and colleagues have presented a smaller set of sufficient 69 
assumptions consisting of risk neutrality and the “zero condition” (which implies that for a 70 
duration of zero life years, all health state values are equivalent) (3).  Alternatively, 71 
Miyamoto and colleagues further demonstrated that, with non-linear utility functions, this set 72 
becomes the zero condition and “standard gamble invariance” a special case of the utility 73 
independence of duration of survival from quality of life) (4). 74 
 75 
On the other hand, besides risk attitude and time preference (which are issues not specific to 76 
health and QALYs), the empirical literature on whether the QALY model holds have 77 
typically addressed one or both of the following two questions:  78 
1. Is the value of a state affected by how long the state lasts? 79 
2. Is the value of a state affected by the states that come before or after it? 80 
 81 
The first question is related to three concepts: utility independence of quality of life from the 82 
duration of survival, constant proportional time trade-off, and maximum endurable time.  The 83 
first two terms both mean that the value of a health state is independent of its duration (2;5;6).  84 
Utility independence here means that values elicited using Standard Gamble (SG) with some 85 
given fixed duration are unaffected by this specific choice of duration.  Constant proportional 86 
time trade-off means that values elicited using Time Trade-Off (TTO) are not affected by 87 
duration i.e. the same proportional amount of time is traded-off independently of the absolute 88 
duration presented in the scenario.  When these concepts are applied to VAS (Visual 89 
Analogue Scale) values, they mean that VAS scores should not be affected by how long the 90 
state lasts.  Maximal endurable time means that, for some severe states (independent of which 91 
method is used to value them), the value of those states becomes negative after some 92 
threshold duration.  When maximal endurable time takes effect, utility independence and 93 
constant proportional time trade-off are violated. 94 
 95 
The second question can be broken down into two issues.  The first is whether or not additive 96 
separability holds; that is, the value of a health state should be independent of what precedes 97 
or follows it (7).  Under zero discounting, additive separability means that the value of a 98 
complete health profile would be equal to the sum of the value of individual health states that 99 
make up that profile, irrespective of the order of the states.  Obviously, the present value of 100 
the two profiles will not coincide under non-zero discounting, but then, the difference should 101 
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be a function of a positive discount rate alone.  The second is whether or not preference 102 
independence holds.  This requires that “given two profiles that have the same health state 103 
during interval i, preference between them does not depend on the level of health during 104 
interval i” (8).  The testing of this concept does not rely on any assumptions concerning time 105 
preference.  However, there is a large literature in experimental psychology that addresses the 106 
issue of how people’s perceptions are affected by “troughs and peaks”, or sequence effects 107 
(see (9) which includes a brief review).  This suggests that additive separability and 108 
preference independence in the context of QALYs may not be satisfied. 109 
 110 
Thus, this paper reports on a systematic literature review on these two questions.  As can be 111 
seen, these two questions are taken from the set of sufficient assumptions set out in the 112 
literature.  As they are individual assumptions within sets of sufficient assumptions, 113 
demonstrating that any one of these is satisfied individually will not validate the QALY 114 
model (although it may count as additional piece of evidence in favour of the validity of the 115 
model).  On the other hand, since each of these assumptions is also a necessary assumption, 116 
demonstrating that any of these are not satisfied has the potential to invalidate the QALY 117 
model. 118 
 119 
3. THE LITERATURE SEARCH 120 
 121 
The aim of the search strategy was to identify systematically all issues relating to the two 122 
topics of the review through the retrieval of published and unpublished papers.  A method 123 
called ‘citation pearl growing’ (10) was employed, using the citation search facility of the 124 
Institute of Scientific Information (ISI) citation indexes and through reference list searching 125 
(as also used in (1)).  These databases cover the science (including biomedical science), 126 
social sciences (including economics) and arts and humanities literature.  In addition the 127 
websites, publication lists and research registers of relevant organisations were searched and 128 
relevant experts were consulted.  The process of citation searching begins from an initial list 129 
of relevant references, which were put together from the authors’ own collections.  Finally, a 130 
keyword search strategy was developed, based on the indexing terms of included studies, in 131 
order to check the completeness of the primary search method.  The search was restricted to 132 
papers in the English language, dated 2002 or earlier. 133 
 134 
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After three rounds of searching, no additional unique references were retrieved.  This 135 
provided 601 references.  Using the titles and abstracts of retrieved references the first author 136 
undertook the first stage of assessment for inclusion, and then the second author checked a 137 
sample of the references excluded at this stage.  Full papers were assessed for inclusion 138 
independently by both authors.  Through this process, 71 papers were identified as relevant, 139 
including 20 with empirical data.    Table 1 provides information on the empirical studies, in 140 
terms of study design, sample population and sample size.  It can be seen from this table that 141 
most of the empirical studies have used structured interviews with students or patients, and 142 
have often had sample sizes less than 100.  The table also shows the country in which the 143 
study was conducted.  Most of the studies have been carried out in North America, followed 144 
by the UK and Europe.   145 
 146 
4. EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE ON THE QALY MODEL 147 
 148 
4.1 Is the value of a state is unaffected by how long the state lasts? 149 
 150 
4.1.1 Utility independence 151 
 152 
McNeil and colleagues interviewed 37 volunteers (25 executives and 12 fire-fighters) and 153 
asked them to value speech loss for various lengths of time (11).  They found that, while 154 
respondents on average accepted a 14% risk of death to avoid speech loss, none accepted a 155 
positive risk of death when survival was shorter than 5 years.  Bleichrodt and Johannesson 156 
asked 172 students to fill in a questionnaire with SG questions of 10 and 30 year durations, 157 
followed by death (6).  The authors conclude that utility independence is violated at the 158 
aggregate level, with 10-year SG values higher than 30-year SG ones.  Bala and colleagues 159 
interviewed 114 elderly people using 20-year SG and a 1-year SG, both followed by death 160 
(12).  About 25% satisfy utility independence but there is no systematic pattern in the 161 
responses of those who do not. 162 
  163 
4.1.2 Constant proportional time trade off 164 
 165 
Several studies have shown constant proportional time trade off to be a pretty good 166 
approximation of preferences at the aggregate level.  In a questionnaire survey, Pliskin and 167 
colleagues asked 10 respondents (physicians, economists, and statisticians) the number of 168 
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years they will sacrifice to avoid severe or mild angina pain (2).  The same question was 169 
asked with 5-year and 15-year survival baselines.  At the individual level, most respondents 170 
violated constant proportional time trade-off.  However, at the aggregate level there is little 171 
difference between the trade-offs from the 5-year TTO and the 15-year TTO.  Cook and 172 
colleagues interviewed over 500 patients with gallstone disease and, at the aggregate level, 173 
trade-offs for states lasting 12 months and 12 years followed by death were not significantly 174 
different from one another (13).  Bleichrodt and Johannesson found that 10-year TTO and 30-175 
year TTO values (followed by death) did not differ from one another at the aggregate level 176 
(6).   177 
 178 
However, other studies have shown constant proportional time trade off to be violated.  All of 179 
these except the one by Unic and colleagues have found that shorter periods of time are 180 
associated with less trade-offs (i.e. higher implied health state values) (14).  Sackett and 181 
Torrance interviewed 246 members of the public and 29 patients on home dialysis (15).  They 182 
asked respondents to value 15 scenarios covering various health conditions from tuberculosis 183 
to kidney transplant, with durations of 3 months, 8 years, and the life expectancy of a 184 
respondent, all followed by death.  They found that values declined with duration.  In a study 185 
on utility independence of duration on quality of life where 64 hospital inpatients with a 186 
range of conditions were interviewed, Miyamoto and Eraker also explored constant 187 
proportional time trade off, and report that about 25% of respondents did not trade off any 188 
time to improve their current health when the duration was under 1 year, whilst time was 189 
traded off when the duration was over a year (16).      190 
 191 
Stalmeier and colleagues asked four groups of university and high school students (total 192 
respondents 176) to rank two scenarios, one living for a longer time with a severe health 193 
condition and dying, and another living for a shorter time with the same health condition and 194 
dying (17).  The proportion of those who ranked the shorter scenario over the longer one 195 
varied from 44% to 71%.  The vast majority of these (73% to 94%) displayed a preference 196 
reversal, where their TTO value for the shorter scenario was lower than that for the longer 197 
scenario.  Furthermore, regarding those respondents whose preferences were not reversed, the 198 
authors go on to discuss the possibility of a “proportional heuristic” in the TTO.  When 199 
respondents are asked to give the number of healthy years that is equivalent to living in a 200 
given state for 10 years, and then the same for 20 years, respondents may give proportional 201 
answers not because they satisfy constant proportional time trade off but because they see 202 
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that the nummeraire of the exercise has been doubled.  Since this indicates that certain tests 203 
of constant proportional time trade off may be too easy to pass, this has important 204 
implications for earlier studies that demonstrated satisfaction of this requirement. 205 
 206 
Buckingham and colleagues conducted a postal survey of over 4000 members of the public, 207 
with over 1500 usable replies (18).  They report aggregate results from three different TTO 208 
formats for a condition that lasts for the rest of one’s life.  These were: a daily TTO which 209 
was about trading off the number of hours awake per day; a yearly TTO which was about 210 
trading off the number of active days per year; and the lifetime TTO which was about trading 211 
off years of life expectancy.  Assuming that time spent sleeping, ‘lost’ days and lost years are 212 
all valued at zero, constant proportional time trade off will require that the proportion of a 213 
day that is traded off is equal to the proportions of a year and of a lifetime that are traded off 214 
in exchange for full health.  The study found that the yearly values are the highest and the 215 
daily values the lowest.  This suggests that the relationship between the length of the period 216 
and the size of the trade off may not be linear.  There has been one study that has looked at 217 
the effect of duration on VAS responses.  From interview with 236 members of the general 218 
public, Dolan reports values for health states lasting for one month, one year and ten years 219 
“and what happens thereafter is not known and should not be taken into account”. (19).  In 220 
general, the shorter the duration, the higher the value.  Olsen has presented a method whereby 221 
positive implicit time preference rates can be derived for such responses (20).  222 
 223 
4.1.3 Maximal endurable time 224 
 225 
Sutherland and colleagues interviewed 20 health professionals (physicians, biophysicists, 226 
biologists) and asked them to value 7 states, each lasting for 3 months, 8 years, and the 227 
respondent’s life expectancy, each followed by death, using the SG (21).  They were also 228 
asked for the preference between each scenario and death.  A maximal endurable time was 229 
observed for up to 75% of respondents, depending on the health state.  The worse a health 230 
state was considered to be the more respondents indicated maximal endurable time.  231 
Stalmeier and colleagues asked three groups of female university and high school students 232 
(totalling 86 respondents) to value breast cancer related health states (22).  58% indicated 233 
maximal endurable time such that 25 years with metastasised breast cancer (implicitly 234 
followed by death) was preferred to 50 years in the same state (again implicitly followed by 235 
death).  However, 74% of these also indicated preference reversals in TTO such that the 236 
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number of healthy years equivalent to 25 years with metastasised breast cancer was 237 
proportionally smaller than that for 50 years in the same state.   238 
 239 
4.2 Is the value of a state is unaffected by the states that come before or after it? 240 
 241 
4.2.1 Additive separability 242 
 243 
Richardson and colleagues interviewed 63 women who did not have breast cancer to value 244 
four breast cancer related health scenarios using VAS, TTO and SG (23).  Three scenarios 245 
consisted of a single health state while the last one was a profile combining these three states 246 
in deteriorating order followed by death.  Using a 3% and a 9% discount rate, they found that 247 
the number of QALYs calculated indirectly from the individual health states was 30-50% 248 
higher than number of QALYs calculated from the direct value of the profile.  The authors 249 
argue that “the knowledge of future death casts a shadow over, or devalues, the enjoyment of 250 
earlier life years”.  Thus, there is the possibility that the results are driven by the dread of 251 
suffering and death at the end of the scenario in addition to a systematic violation of the 252 
additivity assumption.  253 
 254 
Kuppermann and colleagues interviewed 121 pregnant women and asked them to value 255 
(using VAS and SG) eight “paths”, involving two prenatal diagnostic tests for chromosomal 256 
abnormalities of the foetus at different stages of the pregnancy, different test results, and 257 
outcomes including spontaneous abortion of the foetus possibly related to the test and the 258 
effect on the woman’s fertility afterwards (24).  The paths were then broken down into 259 
discrete states, and the direct valuation of the paths was compared to the indirect values 260 
calculated from the values of the discrete states, assuming no temporal discounting.  At the 261 
individual level, preferences were not additive, and there does not seem to be any obvious 262 
pattern.  At the aggregate level, the mean direct value could be predicted from the mean 263 
values of the discrete states but this was not by means of an additive model weighted by 264 
duration, as suggested by the additivity assumption.  The results were not affected by the 265 
introduction of a 5% discount rate.  In general terms, the indirect values of the paths tended to 266 
be higher than the direct values, including the case where the path was not a deteriorating 267 
one. 268 
 269 
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Krabbe and Bonsel asked 104 (mostly medical) students to value 13 hypothetical health states 270 
on two separate occasions using the TTO (25).  The health states lasted for 10 years.  On the 271 
first occasion the respondents were given two alternatives, one of living in a fixed state 272 
(EQ5D state 21232) and the other of living for x years in the ‘best imaginable’ state followed 273 
by (10-x) years in the ‘worst imaginable’ state.  On the second occasion the second 274 
alternative was changed to to live for z years in ‘worst imaginable’ state followed by (10-z) 275 
years in ‘best imaginable’ state.  Under both formats, after the 10-year period, health was to 276 
return to the current level.  If additive separability holds, then, with appropriate discounting, 277 
the number of years spent in the best health state in the two scenarios should coincide.  This 278 
held for two-thirds of respondents when a discount rate of 5% was used for everybody.  Thus, 279 
on the one hand, by allowing for individual discount rates, a higher proportion of respondents 280 
may have achieved convergence of the numbers of years.  On the other hand, there is also the 281 
possibility that the discount rate that makes the numbers of years converge may not reflect 282 
the genuine temporal preference of the individual, in which case two-thirds could be an 283 
overestimate.  A small proportion of the remaining wanted “best things first”, while the 284 
majority wanted a “happy ending”. 285 
 286 
Mackeigan and colleagues interviewed 89 patients with type-2 diabetes (26).  Nine scenarios, 287 
covering 30 years and followed by death, consisting of diet therapy, insulin use, three 288 
“mono” therapies, three “dual” therapies, and one “triple” therapy were valued using VAS 289 
and TTO.  The study found that the indirect and direct values of the combination therapies 290 
were not statistically significantly different from one another.  However, the agreement 291 
between the two approaches was poor, suggesting that the differences between the health 292 
states may have been too small to invoke the sequence effect.  Spencer conducted interviews 293 
with 29 members of the public that tested for additive separability in two ways whilst 294 
controlling for risk attitude and time preference (27).  In the first test, using the SG method, 295 
the difference between profiles x-y and x-z was compared to the difference between profiles 296 
w-y and w-z, where all profiles lasted 10 years and were followed by death.  The differences 297 
were statistically significant, thus violating additive separability.  The second test was first 298 
proposed by Bleichrodt (28) and consists of a choice between two gambles: one offers a 50-299 
50 chance of the best and worst health states, and the other involves a 50-50 chance of the 300 
best-then-worst profile and the worst-then-best profile.  The respondents were split roughly in 301 
half, 13 preferring the former gamble and 15 preferring the latter, while one was indifferent.  302 
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This suggests a violation of additive separability but it is not systematic and so could, in the 303 
extreme, simply represent noise in the valuation process. 304 
 305 
4.2.2 Preference Independence 306 
 307 
Treadwell presented 163 psychology students with pairwise choices of health profiles (8).  308 
Each combination consisted of two scenario pairs: A with B and A' with B', all with a 30-year 309 
duration followed by death, constructed such that independence is satisfied when a 310 
respondent who prefers A (B) in the first pair also prefers A' (B’) in the second pair.  The 311 
author concludes “independence was more commonly satisfied than it was violated”.  Out of 312 
42 combinations tested, the requirement was satisfied in 36.  Treadwell and colleagues asked 313 
67 outpatients with type-C hepatitis to fill out a questionnaire that asked them six pairwise 314 
choices of health profiles (29).  The profiles were either both followed by “normal” health or 315 
both ended in death.  About two-thirds of respondents satisfied independence.  However, 316 
when respondents were asked to give reasons for their choices, explanations implying 317 
sequence effects were observed e.g. to “get [bad states] out of the way” or to have a relatively 318 
good state before death. 319 
 320 
5. CONCLUSIONS 321 
 322 
Let us summarise the empirical evidence relating to the two questions posed at the beginning: 323 
 324 
1. Preferences over different health states when they are valued using different fixed 325 
durations.  There have been two empirical studies addressing utility independence of SG 326 
responses from duration.  The respondents in these studies did not satisfy this, although 327 
there is no clear pattern in the violations.  There have been eight studies that have looked 328 
at whether constant proportional time trade-off holds for TTO responses.  In general, the 329 
results suggest that the assumption holds at the aggregate level but is violated (albeit in a 330 
largely non-systematic way) at the individual level.  Shorter durations typically have 331 
higher values, and longer durations are sometimes associated with a maximal endurable 332 
time, after which time death is preferred to additional survival in the state.  333 
 334 
2. Preferences over profiles of different health states.  The five studies that have addressed 335 
additive separability suggest that this requirement does not hold but we cannot really 336 
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point to any clear systematic violations.  Two studies have addressed preference 337 
independence, and both found that the majority of respondents satisfy the requirement. 338 
 339 
Thus, contrary to the assumptions of the QALY model, it would seem that an individual’s 340 
preferences over health are influenced by the duration of health states and their sequence.  341 
Given that each of these are necessary conditions for the QALY model to hold, they cast 342 
serious doubt to the validity of the QALY model as a representation of individual utility with 343 
respect to their own health.  Unfortunately, none of these factors appears to impact upon the 344 
QALY model in a straightforward way and so it is not possible at this stage to provide a 345 
simple algorithm to adjust the QALY model to better represent individual preferences over 346 
own health.  However, there have been two developments to generalise the QALY model in 347 
order to overcome known and systematic violations.  The first is the HYE (Health Years 348 
Equivalents), introduced by Mehrez and Gafni (30).  Mehrez and Gafni argue that the 349 
standard QALY concept is flawed because, while the quality adjustment component of the 350 
QALY is preference-based, the life year component is not.  In order to reflect this, they 351 
proposed the HYE, which is based on measuring the value of whole profiles directly, as 352 
opposed to constructing this through values of individual states.  Therefore, it does not 353 
require the additive separability assumption or preference independence (31-35).  However, 354 
its major practical disadvantage is that it is virtually impossible to estimate a value set for all 355 
possible profiles, given the infinite number of profiles there would be.   356 
 357 
The second development concerns generalisations of expected utility theory.  The theory has 358 
offered the main theoretical background to the QALY model, and yet the extent to which 359 
individual choice behaviour violates its axioms is well documented.  The new developments 360 
base the QALY model on, for instance, rank dependent expected utility theory (36-38).  This 361 
line of research consists of identifying theoretical models that satisfy both some notion of 362 
what is rational and real choice behaviour, in order to better explain the way the human mind 363 
behaves when faced with choices regarding health.  However, it should also be noted that 364 
expected utility theory could remain as the theoretical basis on which to make policy choices, 365 
even if actual individual choices violate their axioms.  Or, in other words, the particular 366 
notion of rationality that best fits real individual behaviour does not have to be the one that 367 
forms the basis for policy choices. 368 
 369 
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It should also be noted that, once we turn to putting the numbers to policy use (as opposed to 370 
positive uses), it is usually not the individual preferences but the aggregate (mean or median) 371 
preferences that are applied.  While not all studies report whether or not aggregate 372 
preferences satisfy the assumptions of the QALY model, when they are reported, they appear 373 
to perform much better than individual preferences.  Moreover, many of the violations at the 374 
individual level do not follow a systematic pattern i.e. some people violate an axiom in one 375 
direction and others violate it in another direction, which might simply represent noise in the 376 
valuation process.  Ultimately, it is a matter of judgement about whether the inability of the 377 
QALY model to accurately represent all individual preferences is compensated for by the fact 378 
that it more accurately represents aggregate preferences.  379 
 15 
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 Table 1: Empirical references 
 
Author(s) 
 
Year Refere
nce 
no. 
Design Sample  Sample 
size 
Country of 
study 
Assumptions 
tested 
Technique 
used 
Bala et al 1999 13 SI GP (c) 114 USA UI SG 
Bleichrodt et al 1996 5 SQ S 172 Sweden, the 
Netherlands 
UI, CPT SG, TTO 
Buckingham et al 1996 18 PQ GP (r) 1500+ UK CPT TTO 
Cook et al 1994 14 SI P 500+ Australia CPT TTO 
Dolan 1996 19 SI GP (r) 236 UK CPT TTO, VAS 
Krabbe et al 1998 25 E S 104 the 
Netherlands 
AS TTO 
Kuppermannn et al 1997 24 SI P 121 USA AS SG, VAS 
MacKeigan et al 1999 26 SI P 89 Canada AS VAS, TTO 
McNeil et al 1981 12 SI GP (c) 37 USA CPT SG 
Miyamoto et al  1988 11 SI P 64 USA CPT TTO 
Pliskin et al 1980 2 SI HP 10 USA CPT TTO 
Richardson et al 1996 23 SI GP (c) 63 Australia AS VAS, TTO, 
SG 
Sackett et al 1978 17 SI GP (r) 
P 
246 
29 
Canada CPT TTO 
Spencer 2000 27 SI GP (c) 29 UK AS SG 
Stalmeier et al 1997 16 SI S 176 the 
Netherlands 
CPT RP, TTO 
Stalmeier et al 1996 22 SI S 86 the 
Netherlands 
MET TTO 
Sutherland et al 1982 21 SI HPA 20 Canada MET SG 
Treadwell 1998 8 SQ S 163 USA PI RP 
Treadwell et al 2000 29 SQ P 67 USA PI RP 
Unic et al 1998 15 SI GP (c) 54 the 
Netherlands 
CPT TTO 
 
 
Key: 
 
Design: PQ = postal questionnaire; SQ = self-completion questionnaire; SI = structured 
interview; E = experiment 
 
Sample: GP (r) = general public (random/quota); GP (c) = general public (convenience); S = 
students; P = patients; HPA = health professionals or academic staff. 
 
Assumptions tested: UI = utility independence; CPT = constant proportional time trade off; 
MET = maximal endurable time; PI = preference independence; AS = additive separability 
 
Technique used: SG = standard gamble; TTO = time trade-off; VAS = visual analogue scale; 
RP = ranking or pairwise choice 
